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Abstract
There is a debate in Argentina about the effectiveness of mandatory lockdown policies in 
containing Sars-Cov-2 disease. This policy has already six months long making it one of the 
longest in the World. The population effort to comply the lockdown has been decreasing over 
time given the economic and social costs that it entails. This contribution analyzes the 
relationship between mobility and contagion in Argentina at a provincial level. It also models 
issues of internal political discussion on regional contagion and the effect of protests and 
unexpected crowd events. I use pool, fixed, and random effects panel data modeling and results 
show that lockdown in Argentina has been effective in reducing mobility but not in a way that 
reduces the rate of contagion. Strict lockdown seems to be effective in short periods of time but 
extend it without complementary mitigation measures it losses effectiveness. Contagion rate 
seems to be discretely displaced in time and resurges amidst slowly increasing in mobility.
Keywords: Covid-19, Sars-cov-2, Argentina, mobility, lockdown, social distancing, panel data
Page 1 of 19
John Wiley & Sons
































































A new disease has shocked the World as never before. It is caused by the new coronavirus. It is 
called “COVID-19” (where ”CO” stands for corona, ”VI” for virus, “D” for disease and “19” 
indicates the year) and also called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus type 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) is a novel zoonotic betacoronavirus that was first reported back in December 2019 in 
Wuhan, China [1]. By October 6th, 2020, the disease has caused more than 810 thousand 
confirmed cases and over 21 thousand deaths in Argentina [2, 3]. SARS-CoV-2 was declared a 
public health emergency of international concern on January, 30th 2020 [4]. The case fatality 
rate of SARS-CoV-2 infection has been estimated between 1.2 and 1.6% with substantially 
higher ratios in those aged above 60 years [5]. In Argentina, the fatality rate for males was 2.1% 
(1,233 deaths) and for females, 1.5% (884 deaths) by July, 2020. Males aged 70-79 years 
concentrated the highest proportion and represented 15.3% (324) of the confirmed deceased 
cases. The median time between the onset of symptoms and death was 11 days [2]). 
This contribution focuses on how Argentina copes with Sars-Cov-2 epidemics. As information 
becomes available with datasets of case description, counting, date, and location across the 
country questions arose on how to explain the national evolution of pandemics. By July, 2020 
the first national dataset was uploaded [2] and that opens many more topics to be explored. 
Currently, no effective medical interventions or vaccines are available to prevent or to treat the 
disease. For this reason, non-pharmacological public health measures such as isolation, social 
distancing, and quarantine are the only effective ways to respond to the outbreak. Isolation 
refers to the separation of symptomatic patients whereas quarantine is the restriction of 
asymptomatic healthy people who have had contact with confirmed or suspected cases.
The most prominent health policy of Argentina has been a long standing lockdown with a 
theoretical geographical segmentation that began back in March 19th and still remains active in 
most of the country. How this measure has affected the rate of contagion? I will present 
empirical evidence relating mobility and the rate of contagion combining epidemiological data 
with geo-located information of mobility at a provincial level to test its effectiveness.
2. Sars-Cov-2 Pandemic in Argentina
The Sars-Cov-2 pandemic is forcing countries worldwide to make consequential policy 
decisions with evolving and limited information. After China publicly released the information 
of the virus, in the last weeks of February Italy registered the first deaths and applied the first 
restrictions and ordered measures to monitor people who could be infected [6]. Two weeks later 
the epidemic was out of control in the northern part of the country (especially Lombardy) and 
other 11 provinces. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported that the interventions 
made by China authorities, including lockdown and social distancing, have significantly 
contributed to the containment of COVID-19 [4].
Figure 1. Map of Argentina with Provinces and Regions
By March 13th in Argentina various provincial governments began approving lockdown rules 
beginning by the province of Jujuy that ordered the suspension of any educational, sports, 
social, cultural, and religious activity (See Figure 1 for the political division of Argentina). By 
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March 15 the president Alberto Fernández jointly with the heads of the two most populated 
districts of the country (Buenos Aires Autonomous City –BAAC- and Buenos Aires Province -
BAP, respectively) announced temporal lockdown measures. These included the suspension of 
all educational activity throughout the country, the full closure of borders for all non-residents 
people and the suspension of all activities and work licenses for riskier population over 60 years 
old, the cancellation of non-essential activities, and any related crowd-activity until March 31st. 
By March 16th, the government of the province of Tierra del Fuego follows. By March, 20th 
long-distance and regional bus services were suspended and circulation within BAAC was 
restricted and the province of Mendoza also ruled quarantine. The national Ministry of 
Economy established a maximum price policy for a basic basket of foods for dealing with the 
economic paralysis. By this time a particular interest was focused to the most densely populated 
territories in a region called as Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area (BAMA or Área Metropolitana 
de Buenos Aires in Spanish) that comprehends BAAC and 18 of its surrounding districts that 
jurisdictionally belongs to the BAP. BAMA is the most populated area of the country 
(approximately 16.4 million inhabitants) and it is practically an almost continuous urbanized 
area.  
By then and given confirmed-cases counts, diverse provinces in the country were adopting 
measures for suspending circulation inside its territories, with total or partial lockdown. Still 
remains isolated cities and towns with checkpoints and embankments medieval-style. National 
government established a scale of phases for lockdown from stricter to more relaxed ones 
(Table 1). These phases began with an initial strict lockdown phase followed by relaxation on 
diverse topics, especially related to mobility but with non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) 
such a face covering, social distancing, avoiding close spaces, among others. Table 1 presents 
lockdown phases applicable to the whole country. So far these phases have been reduced to two 
main ones called Preventive and Mandatory Social Lockdown (PMSL or Aislamiento Social 
Preventivo y Obligatorio in Spanish) and Mandatory and Preventive Social Distancing (MPSD 
for Distanciamiento Social Obligatorio y Preventivo in Spanish). Districts with severe 
contagion or increasing rates are on PMSL and districts that show decreasing rates are permitted 
to MPSD. Allowing to pass from PMSL to MPSD is defined as the length of time it takes for 
the number of reported cases to double. 
During the May 11-24th period President Fernández suspended strict lockdown in the whole 
country (4th phase) with the exception of BAMA that remains on 3rd phase. In the period of June 
8-28th the president suspended lockdown on 18 provinces and they entered to MPSD while 
BAMA and five other minor urban areas remain on 4th phase. 
By June 8th the president decreed defining rules for MPSD that prevailed to that date in 19 on 
24 national districts. Four provinces had urban areas under strict quarantine and MPSD in the 
rest of their territory while BAMA remained in strict PMSL. This situation remains until at least 
October, 2020.
Table 1 
It is by then that Argentina ends up maintaining the world's longest blockade with only a few 
provinces seemingly reaching a contagious peak and the rest continuing to grow exponentially 
[7]. Even more, by August 21st, Argentina surpasses Sweden in terms of total deaths comparing 
to a country that did not uses mobility restriction at all. Even more, the most prolonged 
lockdown is accompanied with one of the largest death rate in terms of death per million of 
inhabitants. Actually it shows a little more than 20 thousands deaths and more than 480 deaths 
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per million of inhabitants approximately, still behind than other Latin American countries such 
as Peru (980 deaths per million) or Bolivia (683) [22]. 
Supporters of lockdown state that a potential slowdown in contagion rate may allow health 
systems to be prepared for the increasing number of positive infection but that is also an item 
for national discussion. A key policy response to the crisis should be increasing in health 
spending, including for improvements in virus diagnostics, purchases of hospital equipment and 
construction of clinics and hospitals [8]. By September, 2020 the district with an appreciable 
increase in widening critical health infrastructure is BAAC with little information on the rest of 
the districts. In any case, none regional health system has collapsed so far [9].
Lockdown in the very short run operates by drastically reducing mobility and it is expected this 
reduction will make contagion to slowdown [10, 11]. Reduction in contagion in the end would 
slowdown the rate of patients being derived to Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and, one of the critical 
bottlenecks of the health system, avoiding the collapse in the use of the scarce mechanical 
ventilation equipment supply [12]. This way the lockdown would buy precious time, flattening 
the curve of contagion and reducing the input in a health system non-prepared for this specific 
scale of pandemics. Evidence for effectiveness on mobility for more than 3 weeks is hard to 
find. As mentioned, mobility is also affected by local, provincial or national restrictions [13, 14, 
15]. While containment is reported successful to a local or regional level [16] it is more difficult 
to observe such a result at a national scale. I will try to understand its implication national-wide 
considering geographical effects on diverse provinces of Argentina. Did lockdown buy time 
slowing down contagion? Did tightening lockdown decrease the spread of the virus? Did virus 
spreading increase because of relaxations on lockdown (for instance, allowing PMSL to 
MPSD)? Did crowded events increase the spreading? I will try to answer these questions with 
econometric tests on publicly available data. By early October, 2020 it is not foreseeable in the 
short run how the government will manage to exit lockdown. It is important then to obtain 
evidence if lockdown deserves still to be an option for dealing with the spread of the virus and, 
in case of loosening that measure, how this will affect contagion. 
3. Data and Modelling Approach
I test the relation between contagion and mobility by implementing panel data models such as 
used by other contributions [7, 17, 18, 19] on different aspects of the Covid-19 pandemics. 
Panel data modeling may be approached considering fixed effects or random effects panel data 
model. Fixed model will assume omitted variables are constantly correlated with the variables 
of the model while random effects models will estimate the effects of time-invariant variables, 
but the estimates may be biased because of a potential omitted variables bias. However, this last 
aspect can be properly modelled [20] while including variables that account for regional effects 
by adding geographical referenced variables in our case. A fixed effect panel data model is also 
implemented for checking if omitted variables may affect the estimates. Fixed effects models 
control for the effects of time-invariant variables. I will present both models covering all 
possible results and interpretations.
Consider the dynamic panel data model with units , and a fixed number of time 𝑖 = 1,2,…,𝑁
periods , with T ≥ 2.𝑡 = 1,2,…,𝑇
 (1)𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑥′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑓′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,      𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
where  is a  vector of time-varying variables. The initial observations of the dependent 𝑥′𝑖𝑡 𝐾𝑥 × 1
variable, , and the regressors, , are assumed to be observed.  is a  vector of 𝑦𝑖0 𝑥𝑖0 𝑓𝑖 𝐾𝑣 × 1
observed time-invariant variables that includes an overall regression constant, and  is an 𝛼𝑖
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unobserved effect fixed effect of the i-th cross section and is allowed to be correlated with all of 
the explanatory variables  and . It is also a random effect if it is independently distributed 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑖
and correlated with the lagged dependent variable by construction.
Data from [21] represents the change on mobility for users who have a mobile phone with 
Google account and GPS-tracking authorization representing the relative respect to a reference 
day measured as average value of the 5-week period between January, 3th and February, 6th 
2020 (prior to pandemics). There are represented categories on movements to residential 
locations, parks, transit stations, workplace, grocery and pharmacies, and retail business. Data 
was obtained for the 26 defined regions of the country: 23 provinces and three special regions 
(BAAC, BAMA, and BPA without BAMA; BAAC is repeated in the BAMA definition but is 
often study as one unit and may present an interesting regional effect). Reported cases to be 
analyzed are confirmed ones on the basis of clinical, epidemiological, and laboratory diagnosis. 
I have data updated up to July, 29th 2020 on confirmed cases of contagion from [22]. This way 
the dataset includes 23 districts on 166 days of information on rate of contagion, mobility 
indicators, and covariates.
Figure 2. Mobility Indicators and Infections in Argentina and Lockdown Dates (2/15/2020 
to 7/29/2020) 
In the estimation model  represents the rate of confirmed cases y in time t in the region i.  𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
represents the type of mobility j identified by the Google mobility reports in time t in the region 
i and their lagged effects and  represent effects fixed in time like geography, time events, and 𝑓′𝑖𝑡
other particular items such as lockdown variables. I define temporal dummy variables for 
representing the time spans of the lockdown and its extension and the relaxation of confinement 
measures across the provinces. Time dummies identifying weekends, national festivities, and 
trends are also added as well as dummies for special incidents: at the beginning of the lockdown 
huge bank queues emerged on the day of pensioner payday because of coordination problems by 
central banks and commercial banks [23]. This incident created involuntary crowds that may 
acted as potential outbreaks of contagion (  and  dummies). Another incidents were 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑞,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑒,𝑡
massive protests on specific days against the lockdown and government (  and  𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑐𝑔,𝑡
dummies). [24] These actions motivate to create one dummy of the day of the incident and 
another dummy after a potential incubation period (12 to 14 days later) for capturing changes in 
the rate of contagion [25]. Table 2 summarizes variables used in the estimations as were 
described. Expected signs are related to the relationship of the respective variable to contagion: 
more mobility would affect positively contagion (except for residential mobility), protests and 
crowd activities are expected also to increase contagion, lockdown and social distancing may 
decrease contagion as well as weekend and national festivities by reducing mobility.  
As an illustrative example, a simple panel data estimation using provincial mobility data of the 
effect of lockdown shows that residential mobility was the only that increase (in average of 
2.58%) while parks (avg. -10.33%), transit stations (-5.21%), workplace (-7.9%), grocery and 
pharmacies (-7.41%), and retail & recreation (-8.82%) showed sharped reductions in Argentina. 
Therefore lockdown and its latter extensions were effective in some way in reducing mobility 
just as Figure 2 presents.    
I define two variables for modeling lockdown. One binary variable represents the strict 
lockdown present at the beginning by the presidential decree of March, 19th ( ). The second is 𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡
another binary variable that establishes almost in all provinces social distancing policy ( ). 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡
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The time lines of activation for each region are summarized in a specific entry of [26]. This is a 
modelling approach also used in [18] but for international comparisons. 
Table 2. Explanatory Variables Code, Description, and Expected Sign
In first approach it is tested static pool, fixed, and random effects panel models relating rate of 
contagion  to mobility and lockdown measures (  and ). Table 3 presents the three 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡
estimations. Retail and recreation mobility and residential emerge as significant and positively 
related to the rate of contagion. Given that the decrees strictly forbidden recreational activities it 
must be inferred that it was the retail part that is related to contagion. Residential mobility 
increases in a trivial manner since lockdown so perhaps this is only a non-related correlation. 
And, in this case, strict lockdown reveals a negative effect on contagion while social distancing 
has apparently no statistical relationship.
Table 3. Initial Estimations in Pool, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Panel Data Model
However, as observed in Figure 2 time series have persistence, as past values influence future 
ones. For this to be taken into account I must rely in a dynamical panel data including lags 
values of the variables. Panel data variables also are stationary according to standard tests. 
Dependent variable is stationary up to 4 lags and covariates are also to even higher lags so 7 
lags are included for these variables in a way of encompassing a week. I assume that provinces 
or regions might play an idiosyncratic role in spreading the virus so geographical binary 
variables were included in the case of random effects modeling.
Table 4 and Table 5 present the result for a dynamic panel data model with fixed and random 
effects, respectively. Five models are presented from simplest to more complex modeling 
adding more variables for detecting each type of effect. In the case of lags and location 
dummies I only publish statistically significant results (p-values ≤ .1). In both fixed and random 
effect models residential mobility emerges as correlated with the rate of contagion as previously 
found with some simpler model option revealing that retail also is significant. Lags of mobility 
are significant in diverse degrees. There is also a repeated significance of all time effects with a 
negative effect (weekend, festivities, and trend). The first two are related to how data was taken 
that made most probably to a potential infected to assist to a medical unit on weekdays than 
weekends to be tested. The trend remarks some diminishing but negligible effect on this period 
of time. Now when focus in the direct effect of lockdown only the simpler modeling most 
notably with random effects is where a significant relationship on contagion emerges. Social 
distance shows no effect and crowd effects have also no significance on the rate of contagion, 
contrary to findings social distance negatively related to contagion [27]. , , , 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑐,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑓,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎,𝑡
and   geographical dummies are significant revealing idiosyncratic shocks on the 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑝 ― 𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎,𝑡
rate of contagion for BAAC, Santa Fe, BAMA and BPO without BAMA, respectively. 
Does lockdown slow down the rate of contagion? The evidence is clear in terms of initially 
reducing mobility. However most provincial rate of contagion continue exponentially growing 
but apparently displaced in time from late March to early May, 2020. Statistically all mobility 
(including residential) are positively associated to the rate of contagion, once considering 
diverse lag structures. Mobility has not stopped completely but sharply reduced initially and a 
later positive trend was steadily growing as time evolves. As for the effectiveness of lockdown 
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on another countries [11] the lapse of time from implementation to effectiveness in reducing 
rate of contagion is observed within a month. Taking that into account and reviewing Figure 2 
again the first month was successful on that purpose. Besides increasing intensive care 
capabilities (creating new room and training new personal for ER), especially in BAAC, 
apparently no other measures (or combination of measures such as suggested by [18]) that have 
been adopted by other countries were adopted to a relevant scale in the whole country. Some of 
them [28, 29] that depends upon people’s preventive measures of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (NPI) related to mitigate the contagion (face covering, social distance, personal 
hygiene, self-quarantine) were suggested and effectively implemented but state-related policies 
are still waiting sound national implementation (such as expanding testing, widespread effective 
use of technology, protective equipment of frontline key workers, contact tracing, among 
others). Programs for tracing such as Detectar (initials from Dispositivo Estratégico de Testeo 
para Coronavirus en Territorio Argentino in Spanish or Coronavirus Strategic Testing Device 
in Argentina Territory) was launched on May after a spike in contagion in BAMA but still lacks 
an effective national scope [30]. 
China put several mitigation policies in place to suppress the spread of the epidemics [3]. In 
particular, confirmed cases were either put under quarantine in specialized hospital or put under 
a form self-quarantine at home but monitored by medical services. In a similar fashion, 
suspected cases were confined in monitored house arrest. These measures aimed at the removal 
of infectious individuals from the transmission process. These extreme measures lead to a sub-
exponential growth in contagion [31]. Another measures such a repeated testing, contact tracing, 
pool testing, also proved to be effective in reducing other cases (specially many Asian countries 
[32]). Combination of anti-contagion policies seem to be effective in a range of countries [18]. 
It is interesting to note that a counterfactual to a scenario of an Argentina not applying 
lockdown deserves a particular analysis.
4. Conclusions
I find evidence on potential answer to different issues relative to an extensive lockdown 
currently operative en Argentina. Firstly, lockdown effectiveness was analyzed. Adopted 
measures can be divided in an initial strict implementation called mandatory lockdown and a 
later lesser strict variant called social distancing. Both policies focus on reducing the mobility 
and through that diminishing the spreading of Sars-Cov-2. Panel data models identify lagged 
mobility variables jointly with time and geographic effects positively correlated to the rate of 
infection. This way, lockdown and social distancing failed by their own in reducing contagion at 
least at this extended period. Abstracting from estimations and by observing data, lockdown 
seems to have been effective in a short period after implantation in reducing mobility but 
without complementary health policies this effectiveness seems to be short-ranged as modeled 
by [18]. On the other hand, the economic sacrifice made by the whole economy seems 
disproportionate to the results even while these figures are no final yet [33, 34]. In any case, this 
contribution has not analyzed deaths, the ultimate cost of the pandemics, even though that data 
on deaths are under-reported [3].
It is desirable to study these effects at a local level (city, department) too for obtaining more 
insights on the connection between mobility and contagion. As no contact-tracing information 
datasets are publicly available yet I may explore sequential pattern of contagion for inferring 
where the contagion began, where it moved, and perhaps anticipate where it going to be.
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Figure 1. Map of Argentina with Provinces and Regions 
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Figure 2. Mobility Indicators and Infections in Argentina and Lockdown Dates (2/15/2020 to 7/29/2020) 
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Table 1. Lockdown Phases in Argentina
Phases Main characteristics
Phase 1. Strict Lockdown Just essential services allowed, the rest of activities are 
banned; 10% population mobility; Doubling rate less to 5 
days without geographical segmentation
Phase 2. Administrated 
Lockdown
Allowances require authorizations; national bans, up to 25% 
of population mobility allowed; Doubling rate 5 to 15 days; 
National exceptions
Phase 3: Geographical 
Segmentation
Allowances might be granted to provincial exceptions; 
National bans; Up 50% of people mobility; Doubling rate 
more 15 to 25 days; Segmentation subject to epidemiologic 
criteria.
Phase 4: Progressive 
Reopening
Allowances might be granted to provincial exceptions; 
National bans: Up to 75% of people mobility; Doubling rate 
higher than 25 days; Local restrictions.
Phase 5: New Normality Allowances might be granted to sustained personal hygiene 
and cares; No national bans; Up to 75% of population 
mobility; No segmentation. 
Source: Ministry of Health of Argentina 
(https://www.argentina.gob.a /coronavirus/aislamiento/fases)
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Table 2. Explanatory Variables Code, Description, and Expected Sign
Variables Description Expected sign on 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 Retail and recreation mobility and 7 lags Positive
𝑥𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑡 Groceries and pharmacy mobility and 7 lags Positive
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 Parks mobility and 7 lags Positive
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 Transit stations mobility and 7 lags Positive
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 Workplace and 7 lags Positive
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 Residential mobility and 7 lags Negative
-𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 4 Dependent variable lags
𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖,𝑡 Dummy for weekend Negative
𝑓ℎ𝑑𝑖,𝑡 Dummy for national festivities Positive
𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 Trend Negative
𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎,𝑡 Dummy for protests (day of the protest) Positive
𝑓𝑑𝑐𝑔,𝑡
Dummy for incubation period since protests (12-14 days 
later)
Positive
𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑞,𝑡 Incident in bank queues Positive
𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑒,𝑡
Dummy for incubation period since incident (12-14 days 
later)
Positive
𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡 Dummy for lockdown (mandatory isolation) Negative
𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡 Dummy for lockdown (social distancing) Negative
-𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑡𝑢,𝑡 Dummy for provinces and regions S.D.
Dependent variable is the rate of contagion . Provinces and regional dummies included in the 𝑦𝑖𝑡
estimations are: BAP ( ), BAAC ( ), BAMA ( ), BAP w/o BAMA (𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑝,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑐,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑝 ― 𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎,𝑡
), Catamarca ( ), Chaco ( ), Chubut ( ), Cordoba ( ), Corrientes ( ), Entre 𝑓𝑑𝑐𝑎,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑎,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑢,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑟,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟,𝑡
Rios ( ), Formosa ( ), Jujuy ( ), La Pampa ( ), La Rioja ( ), Mendoza ( ), 𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑟,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑜,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑗𝑢,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑙𝑝,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑙𝑟,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑒,𝑡
Misiones ( ), Neuquen ( ), Rio Negro ( ), Salta ( ), San Juan ( ), San Luis (𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑖,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑛𝑒,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑟𝑛,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑎,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑗,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑙,𝑡
), Santa Cruz ( ), Santa Fe ( ), Santiago del Estero ( ), Tierra del Fuego ( ), and 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑐,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑓,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑒,𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑓,𝑡
Tucuman ( ) (See Figure 1).𝑓𝑑𝑡𝑢,𝑡
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Table 3. Initial Estimations in Pool, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Panel Data Model
 Pool Fixed Effects Random Effects
Variables 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
       
𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡 -0.028*** -0.031** -0.028***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡 -0.001 0.006 -0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
𝛽0 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 4,043 4,043 4,043 4,043 4,043 4,043
Number of items 25 25 25 25 25 25
R2   0.010 0.008   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Panel Data Estimation of the Effect of Lockdown on the Rate of Contagion (Fixed 
Effects)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
      
𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 0.001** 0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004* 0.004* 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖,𝑡 -0.021** -0.028** -0.028**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑓ℎ𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -0.028*** -0.063*** -0.062***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017)
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 0.063** 0.063** 0.068**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 4 0.054* 0.054* 0.058**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 1 -0.001** -0.001** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 2 -0.002** -0.002** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 4 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 2 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 6 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 7 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 ― 1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 ― 4 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 ― 5 0.001** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 4 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 5 0.005** 0.005** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 6 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
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𝑥𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 5 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)










𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠,𝑡 -0.050 -0.056* -0.012 -0.012 -0.010
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑑,𝑡 -0.024 0.001 0.015 0.015 -0.005
(0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
𝛽0 0.045*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.046***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 4,043 4,043 4,004 4,004 4,004
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
R2 0.010 0.018 0.074 0.076
Number of items 25 25 25 25 25
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; -- implies not inclusion
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Table 5. Panel Data Estimation of the Effect of Lockdown on the Rate of Contagion 
(Random Effects)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
      
𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑡 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005** 0.005* 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖,𝑡 -0.018** -0.026** -0.027**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑓ℎ𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -0.031*** -0.065*** -0.065***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 0.063** 0.062** 0.074***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 4 0.054** 0.054** 0.063**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 1 0.054** 0.054** 0.063**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 2 -0.001** -0.002** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 4 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 1 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 2 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 6 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 7 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 ― 1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 ― 4 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 ― 5 0.001** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 4 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 5 0.005** 0.005** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
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𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 6 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
𝑥𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 5 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)


















𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠,𝑡 -0.053** -0.058** -0.021 -0.021 -0.018
(0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑑,𝑡 -0.032 -0.015 -0.008 -0.007 -0.019
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
𝛽0 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.057*** -0.011 -0.000
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.047) (0.048)
Observations 4,043 4,043 4,004 4,004 4,004
Number of ítems 25 25 25 25 25
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; -- implies not 
inclusion
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